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NORTH DAKOTA BAR SPEECH 
2014 MART VOGEL LECTURE ON PROFESSIONALISM AND 
LEGAL ETHICS 
LAWRENCE J. FOX* 
Thank you, Michael McGinnis, for those too-generous remarks.  I am 
honored to deliver the Vogel lecture this year.  Part of that honor is to 
appear before my great friend, Chief Justice VandeWalle, whom I met 
through the work of the American Bar Association Ethics 20-20 
Commission.  He is a gentlemen and a scholar, and I was so pleased to learn 
he is running unopposed for another term in North Dakota.   
What I did not know was that I was going to go up against Ron 
McLean.  Nobody should have to face that fellow in a courtroom.  Juries 
must swoon before his folksy, persuasive closing arguments.   
I never thought in my lifetime I would have to give this speech.  I 
thought (how gullible am I) that the issues I am to address had been put to 


















 *  Lawrence J. Fox is the George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law at 
Yale Law School, the founder and supervising lawyer of the Ethics Bureau of Yale, and a partner 
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corporate governance.  He is a former chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility and a former chairman of the ABA’s Section of Litigation.  Mr. Fox is 
a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Pennsylvania. 
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I. THE DEATH KNELL OF ASSAULTS ON LAWYER 
INDEPENDENCE 
A. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REJECTED 
The first event was the great multidisciplinary practice (“MDP”) debate 
at the ABA in 2000.  The then Big Five accounting firms had set their 
sights on including legal services in their department stores of financial 
services they were then intent on building, driven by the fact that mere 
auditing work was not expansive and lucrative enough for these leviathans 
of the consulting world.  The problem was that our professional rules were 
impediments to such a growth strategy.  Our obligation of confidentiality 
was inconsistent with the auditor’s duty of disclosure.  Our conflict of 
interest rules, particularly the rule governing imputation, were impossible 
for the accountants to implement; the Big Five world generated bushels of 
serious conflicts that the Big Five studiously left unidentified.  Last, the 
accountants’ dream violated Rule 5.4, the rule designed to preserve one 
aspect of professional independence by prohibiting the sharing of fees with 
non-lawyers.1  That rule may sound like lawyers just wanting to keep the 
 
1.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2006). 
          
444 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:441 
money, but in fact was designed to prevent non-lawyer control of lawyers, 
an inevitable result, if one believes as I do, that non-lawyers would never 
respect the core values of our profession. 
In response to this initiative, the ABA set up a multidisciplinary 
practice Commission that, shockingly, succumbed to the accountants’ 
importuning, proposing a repeal of Rule 5.4’s prohibition on fee sharing.2  
But by the time the proposal came to the ABA House of Delegates, it was 
dead on arrival.  The profession rose up—if not as one, close to it—and 
voted overwhelmingly not to change the rules.3 
1. Arthur Andersen Craters 
That clarion call turned out to be unnecessary.  In litigated matters, 
lawyers like to think the victories come from the trial lawyer’s brilliance.  
But every once in a while, victory comes from the other side’s blunder.  
And the House of Delegate’s verdict on MDP was sealed—I naively 
thought for all time—by one such blunder.  In this case, it was Arthur 
Anderson’s demise as a result of the Enron debacle: the second nail in what 
I mistakenly thought was a coffin.  Enron, the darling of the financial press 
and the Wall Street titans, now cratered into liquidation.4  A subsequent 
autopsy revealed that the bankruptcy had been rendered all but inevitable by 
the fact that the auditors from Arthur Anderson—once the class of the 
accounting world—had been corrupted by the firm’s desire to generate 
outsized fees from Enron on the Arthur Anderson consulting side.5  This 
demonstrated, once and for all (I incorrectly thought), that MDP’s were 
dead, and that professionals henceforth would mind their knitting, not 
compromising their independence by mixing into one enterprise the 
offering of incompatible services. 
2. ALPS Withdrawn 
Third, there was a slight assault on my confidence when, in 2011, the 
President of the ABA appointed an Ethics 20-20 Commission that, in my 
view, was populated with too many cynical academics and BigLaw lawyers 
who were outspoken critics of our profession’s rules governing conflicts of 
interest.  I immediately worried that Ethics 20-20 would become a vehicle 
for a new assault on our citadel, Rule 5.4, as well as other core values, and 
 
2.  See John Paul Lucci, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPS:  A Critical 
Analysis of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDPS Debate After Enron, and 
Recommendations for Other Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. OF CORP & FIN. L. 151, 157 (2003). 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id.  at 190-94. 
5.  Id.  at 193. 
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so wrote the new Commission.  My forecasting, alas, proved correct (oh, 
how I wished I had been wrong), and the Commission launched a trial 
balloon for repealing the applicable rules, this time devising a benign new 
acronym, ALPS, alternative legal practice structures,6 that fortunately 
turned out to be a mountain too far.  But this was only because of an 
organized response led by state bar leaders making it clear the ABA House 
of Delegates was no more interested in compromising core values in 2012 
than it had been back in 2000. 
II. THE KETTLEDRUMS RUMBLE ANEW 
Breathing a sigh yet again, I fooled myself into thinking the issue had 
been put to rest for a very long time.  But no sooner had ALPS been given a 
respectful burial than—you should pardon the mixed metaphor—the 
kettledrums could be heard yet again.  At most recent count they number at 
least four and, in my view, represent real threats to the legal profession’s 
core values—indeed whether our profession can continue as a profession at 
all. 
A. DEWEY LEBOEUF 
Reading the saga of Dewey LeBoeuf can evoke many different 
responses.  First, there is the sadness that must follow the demise of two 
once esteemed, venerable law firms.7  One hates to see such great names 
tarnished and the lives of so many professionals and their related personnel 
devastated. 
Second, one must admit a certain level of schadenfreude in seeing a 
firm that clearly lost its way get its just deserts.  No one played the 
merger/lateral partner game more aggressively than this firm, 
swashbuckling through the legal landscape, picking off fictional books of 
business with guaranties that made the deals for the new recruits sound like 
the firm was snaring free agents for the Bronx Bombers. 
Third, there were the shades of Enron.  Apparent from the indictments 
of the key figures,8 Dewey had turned over its operation in large measure to 
non-lawyers who were running the business of the firm;9 lawyers 
 
6.  James Podgers, Ethics 20/20 Edges Towards Decision on Endorsement of Versions of 
Alternative Law Practice Structures, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/ethics_20_20_edges_toward_decision_on_endorsement_of_versions_alternative/. 
7.  The firm was the result of a merger between Dewey Ballentine and LeBoeuf, Lamb, 
Greene & McGrae. 
8.  Matthew Goldstein, 4 Accused in Law Firm Fraud Ignored a Maxim: Don’t Email, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 6, 2014), http://dealbook nytimes.com/2014/03/06/former-top-leaders-of-dewey-
leboeuf-are-indicted/?_r=0. 
9.  Id. 
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apparently just did not “get it,” but those financial geniuses did.  And the 
effect of Dewey’s rewarding these income statement magicians based on 
the “success” of the firm’s business demonstrates why lawyers must control 
their law firms. 
What had this enlightened regime wrought?  Overpaying fixed sums to 
so-called partners in deals that turned out financially reckless for sure.10  
But anyone can exercise bad business judgment, though, even I, a financial 
neophyte, remember asking how this was not the same mistake the  
long-lamented Finley Kimble made decades ago.11 
No.  It was far worse than that.  These leaders of the firm embarked on 
a course of financial legerdemain.  Now I am not sure whether what 
happened was criminal—though seven guilty pleas from lesser lights surely 
sounds like it was12—but what is uncontradicted is that this law firm’s 
management cooked the books.  And they cooked the books not just to 
defraud third party bondholders who were lured to finance this law firm’s 
continuing recruitment of high-paid lawyers whose books of business were 
not nearly large enough to make them profitable.  That would have been 
bad enough.  No, they cooked the books that they presented to their 
partners, misleading them into thinking that the non-lawyer management 
was running the place in a prudent, profitable way. 
It reminds me of that old joke of the partner in a two-man firm who 
receives double the requested fee from a mistaken client.  Now that partner 
faces an ethical dilemma.  What is that dilemma?  Should he tell his 
partner?  But in this case, there was no overpayment by clients.  Rather, the 
clients did not buy enough services, leaving the firm in treacherous 
financial straits, a fact conveniently covered up by management. 
My reaction was that once again those of us who opposed non-lawyer 
ownership and control of law firms had a new Exhibit “A,” proving yet 
again we were right.  You can then imagine my shock when I read in Law 
360 on March 13, 2014, as I was beginning to focus on a topic for this 
speech, that Jonathon P. Armstrong, a London partner in Duane Morris 
LLP, thought these Dewey LeBoeuf events called for an elimination of the 
rules governing non-lawyer ownership of law firms.13  How could one 
 
10.  Id. 
11.  E.R. Shipp, Finely Kimble, Major Law Firm, Facing Revamping or Dissolution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 1987), http://www nytimes.com/1987/11/11/business/finley-kumble-major-law-
firm-facing-revamping-or-dissolution html. 
12.  Matthew Goldstein, Pleas by “Dewey Seven” Reveal Details on Financial 
Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://dealbook nytimes.com/2014/03/28/pleas-by-
dewey-seven-reveal-details-on-financial-manipulation/. 
13.  Casey Sullivan, Experts in N.Y. argue for non-lawyer funding of law firms, REUTERS L. 
(Jan. 30, 2014), available at https://a next.westlaw.com/Document/ 
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conclude that?  Surely Dewey LeBoeuf’s story does not lead one to 
conclude that law firms need outside capital.  No one needs investors to 
fund imprudent contracts with side-switching lawyers to lure them from one 
firm to the other with income guaranties.  Please save every law firm from 
such an absurd business model.  Moreover, whatever pressure these non-
lawyers brought on Dewey LeBoeuf to lose its fiscal way will bear no 
resemblance to the pressure outside shareholders will create for law firms to 
maximize shareholder value by abandoning pro bono activities, bar 
association participation, and other “frills” of our profession in the name of 
increasing earnings per share or the price of Caldwell & Moore’s14 share 
price, to say nothing of the conflict between the firm’s duty of 
confidentiality to its clients versus the need to make full disclosure to the 
shareholders of the enterprise. 
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA 
The next kettledrum, which we have heard for a while, arises from 
changes that were made in Australia and in England and Wales permitting 
non-lawyer ownership of law firms.15  The experience so far in each 
country has been quite limited16 but, in fact, in Australia there now is non-
lawyer ownership of a few law firms,17 and the Australian firms are making 
forays into the United Kingdom.18  How far behind can it be that 
homegrown United Kingdom firms follow suit, offering shares to the public 
in their law firms as well.19  And, the calls have already begun that the more 
liberal regimes will render United States law firms not competitive in the 
international arena and, for that reason alone, our rules on non-lawyer 
ownership and control should be repealed.20  And any time the clarion call 
goes out that American competitiveness requires change, there is the worry 
that some bilateral treaties on trade or some pronouncement from the World 
Trade Organization may trump our rules of professional conduct—in the 




14.  Caldwell & Moore has been the name I have used for a mythical New York law firm 
since 1987. 
15.  Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits:  Non-Lawyer Ownership of 
Legal Services, Access, and Professionalism 2 (Harvard Law Sch., Paper No. 2014-20), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487878. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.  at 27. 
18.  See id. 
19.  See id.  at 16-26. 
20.  See id.  at 2 n.11. 
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professional rules are adopted state-by-state, there is always the risk that 
one state will approve non-lawyer ownership and, in the name of 
competitiveness, a national race to the bottom will occur. 
C. ACADEMICS ATTACKING OUR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
The academy has been sounding a kettledrum for some period of time 
with unusual enthusiasm.21  Particularly among the professional 
responsibility professors, we find deeply troubling and disquieting antipathy 
towards the profession, in general, and a cynicism toward our individual 
core values, in particular.  One must wonder why these folks are spending 
their careers taking such a dim view of the profession their graduates will 
pursue. 
This approach often focuses on the question of why lawyers should 
have a monopoly on the practice of law,22 and it embraces the idea that 
having more options within the legal industry, including having  
non-lawyers practice law side-by-side with lawyers, would provide 
additional competition—as if having a million lawyers and literally 
hundreds of mega firms does not provide quite enough competition. 
Others disparage the idea of core values.  Consider what my friend and 
co-author, W. Bradley Wendel, argues: 
The trouble with the idea of core values is that it is often invoked 
in a question-begging way, and when the rhetoric of 
professionalism is probed more carefully, it often turns out to be 
merely a cover for a rearguard action to protect the profession’s 
monopoly rents.  The pattern of this argument is familiar:  Some 
characteristic of lawyers not shared with non-lawyers, such as an 
almost exceptionless duty of confidentiality, is identified as a core 
value that would be threatened by the involvement of non-lawyers.  
Lawyers seldom stop to ask, however, whether that posited 
characteristic is in fact a value from a disinterested standpoint.  
Near-absolute confidentiality, for example, may not be a good 
thing from the point of view of affected non-clients, and it may not 
even be desired by clients.23 
Similarly, our core value of self-regulation is attacked by the 
academics:  “Many scholars have argued that the legal profession, acting 
through the organized bar, mostly promotes regulation in the economic  
 
21.  See id.  at 3 n.17. 
22.  See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money:  Outside Investment in 
Law Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 407, 431-38 (2008).  
23.  W. Bradley Wendel, In Search of Core Values, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 350, 351 (2013). 
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self-interest of lawyers, and it is up to other institutions, such as courts or 
legislatures, to protect the public interest.”24 
D. WHO PRACTICES LAW BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND  
 EXCHANGE COMMISSION? 
The loudest and most recent kettledrum sound just came to my 
attention.  I was informed, as I journeyed to North Dakota, that at the 
prompting of Pricewaterhouse, the SEC is considering entreaties to permit 
Pricewaterhouse personnel, whether lawyers or non-lawyers, to practice law 
before this critical agency.  This offensive would pose a double-barreled 
threat to our profession, providing for not only multidisciplinary practice 
and the sharing of fees with non-lawyers, but the practice of law by  
non-lawyers. 
* * * * * 
Taking the four examples set forth above, one can see that the 
profession faces three different assaults on our professional values.  The 
first is renewed attempts to permit multidisciplinary practice in which 
lawyers and other service providers would practice in one organization and 
share in the fees generated by the legal professionals.  Second, the 
profession is faced with the possibility of naked non-lawyer ownership of 
law firms with non-lawyers in complete control of the enterprise and 
lawyers reporting to non-lawyers on all of the matters that count.  Last, 
there is the prospect of non-lawyers formally entering the practice of law 
alongside lawyers with clients having a free choice whether they want a 
lawyer or non-lawyer to represent them. 
III. WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF ALL OF THIS NEW TURMOIL? 
As I survey the scene, there is a combination of self-inflicted wounds 
and injuries we are suffering from outside forces.  Permit me to address 
each category separately. 
A. SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS 
1. Lawyer Misconduct 
Self-inflicted wounds are the most troubling and at the same time the 
most controllable.  The cause of these assaults on our professional values is 
lawyer misconduct itself.  Every time a lawyer fails to live up to the 
lawyer’s professional responsibilities, that episode provides our enemies 
 
24.  Id. 
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with the fodder they need to argue that lawyers are not deserving of any 
special rules or protection because they violate the trust reflected in those 
rules.  And it only takes a few highly publicized examples of misconduct to 
overwhelm what I know to be the fact that 99% of all lawyers respect our 
rules, live them daily, and are proud of the special responsibility reposed 
with lawyers under the present regime. 
One recent example demonstrates the point in most unfortunate terms.  
We learned just last week that there were lawyers at General Motors who 
knew full well of the dangerous ignition switches installed in Chevys and 
Saturns and that those faulty switches had led to a number of fatal accidents 
and other tragic consequences.25  In what was a frontal assault on the 
applicable rules of professional conduct, lawyers who had an absolute 
responsibility to take these matters up the ladder within General Motors to 
the highest authority within the organization, i.e., the Board of Directors, 
not only hid the facts from the General Counsel (an incredible assertion), 
the CEO, and the Board, but misled them as to the seriousness of the 
problem for reasons that are totally inexplicable.26  This action or inaction 
clearly put these lawyers on the wrong side of our professional values.  If 
the General Motors example was the only instance our critics could point to 
it would be bad enough, but time and again we have seen that lawyer 
conduct has aided and abetted client fraud and criminal conduct and even 
gone further to make the lawyer’s principals in the client misconduct.27 
2. The Way BigLaw is Run 
It all began with The American Lawyer publishing profits per partner 
and the sudden recognition by BigLaw that if law firms could only add “X” 
number of billable hours per lawyer per month, the resulting revenue would 
go directly to the bottom line.  From that beginning, our profession saw a 
seismic change in the way law firms were run.  Unproductive partners could 
be jettisoned without pause; swashbuckling rainmakers, often barely 
practicing law at all, moved business from firm to firm at the behest of the 
highest bidder; partner/associate ratios became so extreme that any new 
associate who thought he or she had a meaningful chance at partnership was 
clearly delusional; outside law firms so large that for their partners to meet 
in one location might require the hiring of a convention center.  The list 
 
25.  Michael A. Fletcher, GM releases results of ignition-switch probe, WASH. POST (June 5, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gm-to-release-results-of-ignition-
switch-probe/2014/06/05/31c09d90-ec3b-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story html. 
26.  See id. 
27.  See, e.g., In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. 
Ariz. 1992). 
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could go on and on, but the bottom line is clear.  In following this path of 
obsession with economics and the concomitant ignoring of other values, it 
is hard to generate enthusiasm for the values of our profession or 
conforming one’s conduct to the rules. 
3. No Loyalty 
In my view, it is impossible to demonstrate the loyalty our core values 
must reflect in our dealings with our clients if lawyers are not loyal to each 
other.  Put simply, loyalty is a value that should start at home.  Yet, the 
profession has clearly succumbed to a dog-eat-dog attitude among lawyers, 
often directed toward colleagues in the same firm.  As a result, we read of 
lawyers moving among law firms with the same frequency as planes 
landing at and taking off from O’Hare.  One now searches almost in vain 
for individuals who have actually spent their whole careers in one law firm.  
And the disloyalty of partners to each other translates into even worse 
attitudes towards associates and support staff.  Law firms may be lucrative 
today, but, by and large, they are not happy places.28  And in large part that 
is due to this lack of loyalty.  Why be loyal when I am simply building my 
business at this weigh station so that I can find a new weigh station that will 
pay me even more until, if I am lucky, I might land at Dewey LeBoeuf with 
a guaranteed contract for millions in compensation (Oops!). 
4. Gang of 33 
The last self-inflicted wound is exemplified by the Gang of 33, the 
nickname I gave to the group of general counsel of prominent, prestigious 
and highly successful law firms who made a presentation to the  
Ethics 20-20 Commission that, in my view, caused more damage to our 
profession than any other recent event.29  What these thirty-three lawyers 
urged was the evisceration of our rules of professional conduct governing 
loyalty to our clients.  What they asked is that the rules be changed so that 
all conflicts were personal to the lawyer who was handling the matter, 
permitting law firms to take positions directly adverse to clients of the law 
firm on any matter and at any time, without regard to the nature of the 
matter, so long as the lawyers representing that client did not participate in 
 
28.  See Debra C. Weiss, Are lawyers from top law schools a lot happier about their career 
choice? Statistically the answer is no, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/are_lawyers_from_elite_schools_a_lot_happier_about_th
eir_career_choice_stat/. 
29.  See generally Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three:  Taking the Wrecking Ball to 
Client Loyalty, 121 Yale L.J. Online 567 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-gang-of-
thirty-three-taking-the-wrecking-ball-to-client-loyalty. 
          
452 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:441 
these acts of betrayal.  They also sought the wholesale blessing of all 
prospective waivers of conflicts of interest and the absolute right to sue any 
organizational clients’ parent, subsidiary, or sister corporation. 
The message here was clear.  It was more important for these firms and 
their million dollar plus, plus, plus profits-per-partner never to have to turn 
down a matter for conflict of interest reasons than it was for our profession 
to demonstrate loyalty to our clients.  And in that initiative was a desire to 
sacrifice a core value of the profession and leave lawyers showing no more 
loyalty to their clients than Goldman Sachs or Pricewaterhouse, accepting, 
perhaps even embracing, the end of professional independence as we know 
it. 
In some ways, simply the act of requesting this relief caused almost as 
much damage as its adoption would have caused.  Now the enemies of our 
profession can point to these thirty-three leaders of the best and the 
brightest as proof of how unimportant the core value of loyalty is when, of 
course, we know otherwise. 
B. OTHER FORCES 
1. The Digital Revolution 
The argument has been made that the digital revolution has made it 
possible to break down any given problem into an algorithm that makes it 
so much more possible for laymen to craft documents or handle routine 
legal problems.30  But we lawyers understand that the ability to build the 
most elaborate decision tree of zeros and ones does not provide the 
judgment only lawyers can bring to each engagement.  Moreover, we know 
the assertions that so many aspects of legal services are routine are vastly 
overstated and ignore the fact that even in the delivery of these so-called 
routine legal services, it takes specialized knowledge and training to 
identify the non-routine from among the “routine.” 
E-discovery is another demonstration of how little the digital 
revolution contributes to good lawyering.  While the computer can locate 
many documents that might be privileged, it cannot determine which 
documents are privileged—a topic so vast and convoluted whole books 
have been written on the subject.31  Anyone who has viewed the result of a 
digitized privilege search will know what I mean. 
 
30.  Norman Rozenberg, Will DIY legal tech replace laywers?, DELL (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://techpageone.dell.com/tech-culture/will-diy-legal-tech-replace-lawyers/. 
31.  See, e.g., EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE  
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE (5th ed. 2007). 
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Similarly, computer research is no substitute for lawyer judgment.  It 
might find 956 cases in which “negligence” appears within fifty words of 
femur, but it is virtually no help in telling the lawyer that he or she has 
chosen the wrong search terms or in identifing which of the hundreds of 
cases will actually help the client’s cause.  It has been my experience that 
the abandonment of old-fashioned “in the books” research for the click of a 
mouse results in work product whose quality varies widely. 
2. Calls to Shorten Law School 
The legal profession has felt the effects of the Great Recession.  Jobs 
are down;32 graduates are looking for work;33 law school applications are at 
thirty-five year lows;34 and the cost of law school has soared.35  These are 
critical issues that must be addressed.  But one solution that has been 
repeatedly suggested is unacceptable.  That is to shorten law school to two 
years.36  Law school was three years back in 1939 when my dad graduated 
from Penn Law.  It is still three years despite the explosion in the topics law 
schools now address and how increasingly complicated the existing topics 
have become.  Dismal bar passage rates do not begin to prove that our 
students are over-prepared to practice.  All that adoption of a two-year 
requirement would suggest is that those undergraduates who have not 
attended law school are merely missing four semesters of instruction. 
Imagine the outcry if we learned that because of the six-figure loans 
incurred by newly-minted medical doctors, medical school should be 
reduced by one year.  We would be appalled by the risks an omitted year 
would create.  Why then should not the outcry—particularly by lawyers 
themselves—be equally loud in response to these suggestions?  The core 
value of a complete education should not be compromised. 
3. Those Who Want to Share 
The last outside force causing consternation is the Pricewaterhouses 
and Goldman Sachses of the world, behemoths that each represent a 
phalanx of enterprises who see “gold in them thar hills.”  The former, 
 
32.  Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2011), http://www nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/24lawyers html. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide in Law School Enrollment Accelerates, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://dealbook nytimes.com/2014/12/17/law-school-enrollment-
falls-to-lowest-level-since-1987/. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Peter Lattman, Obama Says Law School Should Be Two, Not Three, Years, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://dealbook nytimes.com/2013/08/23/obama-says-law-school-should-be-two-
years-not-three/. 
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notwithstanding the lessons of Enron, want to offer legal services without 
limitation, but will be happy to start with the IRS and the SEC as forums 
that will welcome their officious intermeddling, Rule 5.4, Rule 1.7, and 
others be damned.  The latter want to be the investment bankers as these 
law firms go public, offering shares to “passive” investors (but hardly 
passive about return on investment), and then making a market in the shares 
of the next Dewey LeBoeuf and Brobeck Phlegler. 
IV. WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SPEAK OF CORE VALUES? 
In the face of these threats, we (particularly I) have found shelter in the 
defense that any of these developments would compromise our core values, 
destroy our independence, eviscerate client protections, and end law as a 
profession.  But while proceeding on this path I feel that I, especially, and 
many like me, have taken too cramped a view of core values.  Yes, we have 
argued that the loss of professional independence was inevitable and that 
our client protections would be compromised or eliminated by those not 
subject to our regulatory regime.  But as I contemplated this speech, a much 
broader view of why lawyers are special emerged: not because we have any 
special entitlements or prerogatives, but because we have special 
responsibilities to our clients, to the judiciary, to the bar, and to the public.  
Permit me to enumerate my catalogue.  Maybe you can think of others. 
A. COMPETENCE 
Susan Martyn, my long-suffering co-author, and I have developed the 
teaching construct of the five C’s.  The first of these is competence, and the 
concept embraces all of those requirements our profession has established 
to entrust the affairs of others in the hands of qualified fiduciaries.  The 
following are required for such a high task: a three-year education in an 
accredited law school, meeting the ABA’s exacting requirements, passage 
of a bar exam, surviving character and fitness review, and continuing legal 
education required either by bar rule or the demands of the practice.  The 
law is complicated, nuanced and ever-changing.  It takes competent lawyers 
to master it. 
B. THE OTHER FOUR C’S 
These are the heart of the core and also what we traditionally 
enumerate as “core values”:  (a) We are agents of our clients; it is the client 
who determines the objectives of the representation,37 requiring the lawyer 
 
37.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2006). 
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to adopt a collaborative approach respectful of the client’s dignity and 
authority, in short, client control.  (b) The lawyer has affirmative duties of 
communication.38  The client must be informed before the client asks and 
the duty of communication comprehends bad news, including informing the 
client of the lawyer’s own blunders.  (c) Absent the client’s informed 
consent, itself a defined term requiring full communication with the client, 
the lawyer’s lips are sealed, refusing to disclose any confidential 
information of the client,39 a category that is as big as all outdoors, 
including facts that are in the public domain and those that are generally 
known.  (d) And the last C, perhaps a stretch C-wise, is conflict of interest 
resolution—what we require in order to reflect the loyalty to prospective, 
present, and former clients in terms of identifying conflicts and then either 
seeking a waiver (if the conflict is waivable), again on informed consent, or 
refusing to take on or resigning from the conflicting representation.40  No 
other line of endeavor comes close to these strict fiduciary duties that are at 
the core of who we are as lawyers. 
C. DOING BUSINESS WITH CLIENTS 
Is there another for-profit enterprise that recognizes as a core value that 
doing business with clients must be carefully circumscribed?  Lawyers may 
not do business with clients if that would create a conflict of interest.41  And 
if a business relationship is pursued, the client must be informed in writing 
about the transaction, the client must be given an opportunity and the advice 
to consult another lawyer, the client must be warned of the risks involved, 
and the transaction has to be entirely fair to the client, a conclusion that has 
to be true both going into the relationship and after the fact.42 
D. REASONABLE FEES 
Jokes aside, lawyers may only charge reasonable fees.43  Without 
asserting that some present lawyer fees (including my own) are reasonable 
only in the BigLaw world, it remains true that any client, at any time, and 
without regard to the how splendid the outcome, can challenge the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s fees, a core value that reflects as well as 
anything how our profession has assumed special responsibility by arming 
 
38.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006). 
39.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006). 
40.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2006). 
41.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2006). 
42.  Id. 
43.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2006). 
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our clients with this unique power.  One can only imagine how certain 
nameless non-lawyer enterprises would look and act if they subjected 
themselves to such a high standard. 
E. UNLIMITED POWER . . . RESTRAINED 
We lawyers rarely pause to contemplate our power, why it is we must 
be officers of the court, why entrance into the priesthood requires going 
through a series of culling gates (yet another mixed metaphor).  But it is the 
awesomeness of this power that so prompts granting it only to those who 
have demonstrated the knowledge, judgment, and character to be entrusted 
with it. 
This power applies to all lawyers, not just litigators.  In the 
transactional field, few “deals” would ever close if it were not for the 
opinion-giving authority of lawyers, opining on important matters such as 
capacity, authority, conformance to law, full disclosure, tax  
implications—the list is endless.  In short, lawyers are truly the gatekeepers 
here, either opening or slamming the gates shut depending on the 
circumstances and based solely on their expertise and integrity. 
And, of course, the power analysis applies full bore to trial lawyers.  
Every time I sign and file a complaint, I pause to contemplate the awesome 
power we possess.  With no more than our John Hancock we trigger all the 
trappings of the courts.  Judges get assigned.  Subpoenas issued.  
Documents demanded.  Depositions conducted.  Juries impaneled. 
F. LIMITS ON ADVOCACY 
That awesome power is tempered, as it should be, by limits on lawyer 
advocacy.  These are the limits that, again, reflect a core value of our 
profession, a brook on our authority that has no real cognates in the free 
enterprise world.  Lawyers owe a duty of candor to the tribunal.44  This 
covers a number of special responsibilities, none more challenging than the 
obligation to correct false testimony, even false testimony by one’s own 
client.45  Similarly, lawyers may not advance arguments or claims that do 
not have a sound basis in fact and law.46  Lawyers have special obligations 
when dealing with anyone who is unrepresented.47  Yet a fourth example is 
the lawyer’s obligation to respect the rights of third parties, even 
 
44.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2006). 
45.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006). 
46.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006). 
47.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2006). 
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adversaries, by avoiding opportunities that the inadvertent acts of our 
opponents present from time to time.48 
G. OUR OBLIGATIONS WHEN NO ONE IS LOOKING 
What do we do when no one is looking?  There can be no more telling 
demonstration of the special trust that is bestowed upon lawyers than those 
activities we engage in hidden from the prying eyes of courts or opponents.  
I think of two in particular.  First, consider document production.  Requests 
are served, files—electronic or otherwise—are searched, responsive  
non-privileged documents are produced and those withheld are identified in 
detail on a privilege log.  How easy it might be to withhold a damaging 
document.  Or fail to disclose that an allegedly privileged document was 
sent to an individual who arguably breaks the privilege.  And the only way 
the system works is because we believe that lawyers recognize and fulfill 
the sanctity of their role. 
Similarly, lawyers regularly engage in witness preparation.  Indeed, we 
believe it is a lawyer’s duty to do so.  But the line between prep and the 
suborning of perjury is a fine one.  And no one is in the conference room 
except lawyer and witness.  Yet, lawyers take the responsibility for doing 
no more than gussying up the truth, recognizing and fulfilling this 
additional duty that the officer-of-the-court role imposes upon them.  Of 
course lawyers are not perfect, but they achieve a level of perfectibility that 
is worthy of respect—one that the rest of the world (and maybe a few law 
professors) do not begin to appreciate. 
H. THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 
Now I come to a series of core values that extend beyond the  
lawyer-client role while also defining us as professionals, core values that 
are impossible to imagine co-existing with a publicly traded Caldwell & 
Moore, or lawyers providing legal services to third parties for a  
wholly-owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs. 
Lawyers play the instrumental role in the disciplining of professional 
colleagues who have violated rules of professional conduct.  Lawyers serve 
on hearing boards, render decisions, monitor the system’s effectiveness, and 
suggest improvements to the system itself.  They develop diversion 
programs and seek to prevent misconduct through professional instruction 
and lawyer assistance programs, giving thousands of hours of time to the 
endeavor. 
 
48.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2006). 
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I. CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNTS 
Following guidelines they themselves have helped establish, lawyers 
maintain, under strict scrutiny, lawyer trust accounts that hold hundreds of 
millions of dollars that belong not only to clients, but also third parties, 
including their clients’ adversaries.  And they do so gratis, despite the 
heavy responsibility such trust accounts impose. 
J. CLIENT PROTECTION 
Volunteer lawyers administer client protection funds in every state, 
imposing fees on themselves and their colleagues to pay off claims when, 
sadly, lawyers convert client funds to their own use. 
K. THE BAR 
It seems altogether fitting to remind ourselves at this wonderful North 
Dakota Bar annual meeting of the institutions we have created called bar 
associations.  Think, just for a moment, of all that bar associations 
undertake.  Continuing legal education, publication of magazines, law 
reviews, and books covering the gamut of topics from how to start a law 
office to the meaning of the equal protection clause, recommendations to 
the courts regarding rules of professional conduct, professionalism, 
disciplinary standards, rules of civil procedure and evidence, regulation of 
trust funds, IOLTA requirements and administering the distribution of those 
funds, establishing committees and sections to provide attention to 
specialized areas of the law, fostering diversity initiatives, lobbying for and 
contributing to legal services for the poor, and evaluating judicial 
candidates.  The list is just a sample, but the scope and intensity of these 
activities reflect a dedication by lawyers to improving the profession and 
supporting the rule of law measured in millions of hours, all without 
compensation and largely unheralded. 
L. DEFENDING THE JUDICIARY 
The role of an independent judiciary is an essential component of our 
legal system.  Though not perfect, the judiciary we have is the best we can 
achieve consistent with human frailty and the unfortunate election of 
judges.  Far too often the judiciary is attacked for results that are unpopular, 
even divisive.  Some may be justified; some may be pure pandering for 
political advantage.  Either way, if judges act consistently with their special 
ethical obligations, the judges must speak through their opinions.  They 
may not respond to their critics directly.  That is when the job falls to the 
lawyers who, by and large, fulfill their obligation to defend the 
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independence of the judiciary, a special responsibility that the bar has 
embraced. 
M. PRO BONO 
Last, but by no means least, there is the obligation of lawyers to 
perform pro bono services.  While this obligation is not mandatory under 
our rules, the fact is that lawyers and law firms dedicate millions of hours to 
pro bono services annually.49  Lawyers working pro bono handle everything 
from the representation of children in family court matters addressing with 
whom the child shall live through post-conviction proceedings in capital 
cases.  Lawyers similarly represent, on a pro bono basis, not-for-profit 
organizations, and whole institutes have been devoted to train lawyers to 
handle these complicated and important matters.  Suggested minimum 
requirements for pro bono are found in the professional rules of conduct.50  
Those who rank law firms, such as The American Lawyer, evaluate law 
firms on the extent of their pro bono commitment, with many firms 
dedicating from three to five percent of their hours to pro bono 
engagements.51  Law firms and lawyers also compete for various awards 
that are given by the American Bar Association and state and local bars to 
honor pro bono service.  Bar associations also establish training programs 
for undertaking pro bono engagements, and it is not unheard of for law 
firms to commit millions of dollars in disbursements and multiple millions 
of dollars in time to their pro bono endeavors.  In short, pro bono work is 
one of the most critical core values of our profession and sets the profession 
apart, in a quite remarkable way, from those enterprises that would love to 
own law firms or help establish law firms as public companies owned by 
their passive shareholders. 
V. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WITH NON-LAWYER OWNERSHIP? 
Given the foregoing, one can fully comprehend how the three 
incursions would leave the profession diminished in significant ways, 
perhaps unworthy of the title at all. 
 
49.  See, e.g., Pro Bono and Community Service, LATHAM & WATKINS, 
http://www.lw.com/AboutUs/ProBonoAndCommunityService. 
50.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1(a) (2006). 
51.  See Pro Bono: How Does Your Firm Rate?, THE AM. LAW. (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202608682486/Pro-Bono-How-Does-Your-Firm-
Rate?slreturn=20150230205511. 
          
460 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:441 
A. LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE 
This has been the classic argument that I believe still carries as much 
force as ever.  If control of law firms is in the hands of “passive”  
return-on-investment-obsessed shareholders or even other service providers, 
the loss of independence is inevitable.  Everyone recognizes that control 
equals power and that the operation of for-profit enterprises is to be 
conducted in the best interests of their shareholders or owners.  For lawyers, 
that is not the case.  Our work must be undertaken in the best interests of 
our clients, as so many of our core values that I outlined above demonstrate.  
Only reasonable fees may be charged.  Only business transactions with 
clients can go forward if they meet fundamental fairness principles.  The 
client gets to decide the objectives of the representation.  The list could go 
on.  But the achievement of these obligations can only occur in the context 
where lawyers are in complete control of the institution. 
Our detractors argue lawyers already lack independence.  Some 
lawyers work directly for corporations who employ them full time.  Other 
lawyers are paid by third parties, e.g., by an insurance company to represent 
the client.  Those situations, it is asserted, compromise independence.  That 
is certainly true, and the profession has had to fight long and hard to 
maintain the independence of lawyers who are in those positions because, 
in fact, they can compromise independence.  But that is no reason for us to 
compromise further by permitting non-lawyers to own law firms, whether 
as investors or as part of a multidisciplinary practice, when there is no 
countervailing benefit to be derived from doing so.  Indeed, one can 
extrapolate, particularly from the insurance company example, to conclude 
how much worse things would be if Caldwell & Moore were a public 
company. 
B. CONFUSION OF VALUES 
Lawyers are required to maintain confidentiality.52  Auditors and other 
professions have duties of disclosure.53  Lawyers owe their obligations to 
their clients.  Auditors, in particular, have duties to the public that trump 
any duties they might have to their clients.  The accounting firms ignore 
what we call conflicts of interest and treat duty of loyalty as a duty owed by 
individuals in the firm, rather than the firm itself.  The Goldman Sachses of 
this world are even worse.  They have fought tooth and nail to avoid owing 
anything that resembles a fiduciary duty to their customers.  They think 
 
52.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006). 
53.  See generally Leo C. Moersen, The Independent Auditor’s Duty to Disclose Corruption, 
11 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 89 (1992). 
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nothing of the horrible conflicts created in selling collateralized mortgage 
obligations to their customers at the same time they sell those same 
obligations short for their own account—on an undisclosed basis, of course. 
C. ANOTHER MOUTH TO FEED 
It surprises me when some argue that lawyers’ monopoly on the 
delivery of legal services results in costs that are too high; these dissenters 
assert public ownership of law firms would make costs come down.54  It is 
certainly true that I am arguing for the practice of law to be in the exclusive 
domain of lawyers.  But that is not a monopolistic statement.  All one has to 
do is interview lawyers at all levels of our profession, from sole 
practitioners to the globe-straddling, multi-partner colossi, to learn that the 
competition to provide legal services is as robust as it has ever been. 
Moreover, adding outside investors to the equation will only increase 
the cost of legal services because those passive investors are anything but 
passive when it comes to their interest in a return on their investment.  They 
will not buy shares in Caldwell & Moore for charitable reasons.  They will 
expect law firms to compete with General Motors and Google in terms of 
return on investment or stock appreciation.  In short, there is no way the 
delivery of legal services will become less expensive when the law-firm 
family invites hungry investors insisting on their fair share to the dining 
room table. 
VI. CONCLUSION—RECAPTURING OUR PRIDE 
My hope is that the foregoing is viewed as the sermon of a cheerleader 
for the profession, if you’ll pardon another mixed metaphor.  I think we, as 
lawyers, have so much for which we can be proud.  We have the right 
values.  We have the right interests.  We have the talent.  We have the 
expertise.  What we are missing is effective advocacy on our own behalf.  
Advocacy to respond to our detractors with the message that lawyering 
should be left to lawyers—the only individuals qualified by training, values, 
and experience to deliver the legal services the public needs. 
 
 
54.  See, e.g., Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing to Protect 
Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683 (2014). 
